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This short essay proposes a combined framework of  Reception Aesthetics and feminist 
Standpoint Theory as an approach to the circulation of  scientific knowledge and to a 
Historical Epistemology. The article argues that Reception Aesthetics provides intellectual 
tools to examine how ideas were appropriated at each conjuncture and made productive. 
Standpoint Theory focuses on how local agents can be scientific and epistemically productive 
and relevant, and how scientific labour is divided according to cultural, economic, and 
geographical factors. Here it is argued that the articulation of  both outlooks can be fruitful 
for elucidating how the production of  scientific knowledge with its normative criteria are 
distributed, how the dynamics of  contemporary circuits of  scientific exchange can be 
conceptualized, how the possibilities and limits to making past knowledge productive can be 
discussed, and how a normative stance can be built from the relationship between epistemic 







In an well-known article, Secord (2004) concluded that although conceiving of  the history 
of  science as a form of  contextualization has been an advancement for the field overall, it 
ended by equating “context” and “history”, and confusing the approach itself  due to 
imprecisions in the definition of  objects and frameworks (p. 659). He called for a new, 
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“foundational” way of  understanding historicity in science as “an act of  communication, 
with receivers, producers, and modes and conventions of  transmission”, oriented towards 
“eradicating the distinction between the making and the communicating of  knowledge […] 
[and] thinking about statements as vectors with a direction and a medium and the possibility 
of  response.” (p. 661). This implies not only the study of  the circuits, media and mechanisms 
of  circulation of  knowledge, a line of  analysis pointed out by transnational history (Heilbron, 
Guihot & Jeanpierre, 2008; Turchetti, Herran & Boudia, 2012) but also an investigation into 
who produces knowledge and how it is modified in the process. That is to say, a conception 
in which the role of  production of  knowledge, and the role of  appropriation and 
reconfiguration of  knowledge, are two modalities of  the same process — the producer is 
already a receiver, and the receiver can be considered a producer. 
What is at stake here is not only a renewed way of  thinking about history of  science, 
but also an epistemological statement: scientific theories, methods, evidence, discussions and 
consensus are a result of  the circulation of  knowledge. That is to say, scientific production 
is not merely spread from one point to another but inherently distributed through different 
spaces and times. This description, which may seem trivial, is still not often taken as a starting 
point to conceive how scientists have been thinking and working through different times and 
places. Scientific knowledge’s situatedness is not thinkable without taking into account its 
mobility, through time and across geographies. In this respect, both scientific outcomes and 
criteria for theorizing and obtaining evidence demand that a Historical Epistemology (HE) 
reconstructs and appraises scientific evolution. 
This short essay aims to provide some intellectual tools, derived from my own 
research on the reception of  Soviet and communist psychology in Argentina (García, 2014a, 
2014b, 2016a, 2016b), for a historical epistemology of  the sciences, in line with Secord’s call, 
but with a different approach that highlights not just the communication in science, but 
stresses how situated agents appropriate and make circulating knowledge productive. The 
idea that epistemology and philosophy of  science requires a historical basis is not new (e.g. 
Fleck, 1935/1979; Bachelard, 1938/2004; Metzger, 1987), but in recent years that demand 
has gained new attention and many versions of  such a reconsideration have been proposed 
(e.g. Daston, 1994; Renn, 1996; Galison, 2008; Rehinberger, 2010). HE, as well as its 
companion, Epistemological History, remains a very imprecise field, however; agreements 
are rare and there are many terminological and conceptual juxtapositions that still require 
elucidation (e.g. Sturm, 2011). Nevertheless, this state of  indeterminacy broadens the search 
for intellectual and methodological tools. The approach to an HE proposed here is not 
normative; it does not offer criteria for deciding which knowledge is more accurate or 




consistent, and is not proposed as a closed or complete model.  
Instead, it offers an outline of  the ways one might deepen an examination of  where, when, 
how, by whom, and for whom knowledges have been produced. This allows for a 
consideration of  science as an endeavor that results from combined conjunctures, as an 
historical outcome tout court. This strong emphasis on historicity is still not incompatible with 
analytical and normative approaches; nevertheless, it obliges one to consider both 
contemporary and past epistemological norms, their situatedness and interaction. The aim, 
therefore, is to search for a historical reflexivity that provides information not only about 
specific knowledges and their contexts, but also about the epistemological frameworks used 
or presupposed by historical figures and contemporary historians and scientists, in an 
informed and productive recovery of  the past. 
In order to do so, this article offers an outline for the possibilities of  a combined 
framework of  Reception Aesthetics (RA), proposed in the German tradition of  literary 
theory, and Standpoint Theories (ST), formulated in the feminist philosophy of  science, as 
historiographical and epistemological resources for the history of  sciences. RA is considered 
to have been a renovating outlook for the study of  the circulation and changes in cultural 
production (e.g. Hohendahl, 1977; Dotti, Blanco, Plotkin, Vezzetti & García, 2008). What 
RA provides is not a proper historiographical framework, but a strategy for analyzing 
historical sources without a previously defined goal. This open-ended feature allows for 
diverse articulations with several other historiographical tools and approaches (e.g. Vezzetti, 
1996; Wieviorka, Burguière, Chartier, Farge & Vigarello, 1998; Woessner, 2010). Here an 
articulation with ST is offered; this philosophical approach is proposed by their advocates as 
a renewed starting point for scientific thinking, and as such it is normatively driven. However, 
in contrast to the mainstream philosophy of  science, ST considers that historical factors are 
constitutive of  such normativity, and allows for an exploration of  how scientific knowledge, 
and the scientists as agents, have been historically determined, both in the past and in the 
present. 
This brings many challenging conceptual and methodological issues to the forefront, 
such as the possibility of  using the past to establish normative criteria for the present, and 
vice-versa. While RA and ST are not new approaches, they have not been systematically 
articulated before; this brief  essay proposes that a combined framework can be a fruitful 
historiographical strategy to highlight the entanglement of  objects and processes, impossible 
to attain by a single approach. In particular, RA and ST have features that can be useful to 
illuminate the production, circulation and embedding of  scientific knowledge. I propose here 
that the articulation of  both approaches is useful for an accurate historical analysis of  the 




specificities of  conditions of  production and circulation of  scientific knowledge, as well as 
the capabilities of  scientists as local agents. 
 
 
Circulation through geographies and history: Some features of 
Rezeptionsäesthetik 
 
The main innovation of  RA – contrary to what the word “reception” may suggest – was to 
locate the reader as a productive agent of  a literary work, differentiating him or her from the 
reader presupposed by the author as an intended public. The variation of  readers over 
moments of  time and geography allowed for the introduction of  the historical-aesthetic 
problems of  how an oeuvre can retain its value across time, how a network of  readers can 
develop, and how each reader and context for reading can have an impact on the 
consideration of  that oeuvre. According to H. R. Jauss (1970/2000), consecutive readings 
are those that “concretize” and give historical life to each work. The value of  a text depends 
on this evocative potentiality in different readers, derived from the intersection between the 
“horizons of  expectation” created by a work and the expectations of  the reader. The reader 
is reinstated as an agent who due to his or her historical placing, can make a reading effective 
and enhances the text through successive readings. From this stance, the reader as historical 
agent also has an epistemic role: it is through the act of  reading, in the permanently updated 
historical relationship among author, work, and reader that the productivity and historicity 
of  literary activity resides. Literary history is not a mere sequence of  events, but the 
recognition of  inherent change in any literary production due to the updating of  readings. 
The task of  history is thus the reconstruction of  the mediations that allow the contact of  
the past (of  a work) with the present (of  a reading). This outlook opens the possibility of  
making historical studies to characterize specific readers – those expected by an author, those 
who read in practice, and the distance between them – which results in a history of  the 
activity and skills of  reading in itself  and a history of  the dissemination, publishing process 
and marketing of  books. A solid tradition already exists in this area of  historical studies (e.g. 
Darnton, 1982; Chartier, 1994; Moretti, 2006), yet scientific texts are still scarcely addressed 
in such perspective.2 
 
2 As RA is focused on the appropriation of  circulating knowledge, it is mostly dependent on published texts. 
Yet correspondence, outlines, notebooks, unfinished manuscripts and other “private” and never published texts 
can be meaningful for reconstructing the genesis and development of  scientific ideas (e. g. Holmes, Renn, & 
Rheinberger, 2003). RA does not exclude per se the analysis of  these kinds of  materials, as they may be helpful 
in establishing the distance between the actual work of  research and the way the results were later 
communicated. However, as they are accessible to only a few specialists, their value for studying reception 
processes in different publics is limited. 




According to Eagleton (1983/2011), literature should not be restricted to a specific 
genre, given that genres are mutable and the same text might belong to several of  them. It 
can even be said that “[t]here is therefore always the possibility of a vacillation of meaning, a 
chording of significance, that will break through generic constraints, whether the genre be 
that of poem, drama, novel, scientific paper” (Beer, 1990, p. 91). If  this stance is admitted, 
scientific texts can be analyzed from the framework of  reception, as they are also a kind of  
mutable literature. Yet, linguistic or aesthetic analysis should not overshadow the fact that 
scientific texts have peculiarities that cannot be merely considered to be part of  a “genre” 
and need specific considerations. As a result of  actions by the reader, the dissemination and 
reception of  a scientific text is modulated by a series of  characteristics that are considered 
to be scientific in specific moments and places. First of  all, scientific texts intend to reveal 
the effective and material features of  reality, so they aim for a clear and distinctive writing 
and vocabulary, and tend to minimize literary devices such as metaphors, unless they are 
suitable to acknowledge the available empirical evidence. Secondly, their technical vocabulary 
defines the circuits of  dissemination; the reader is usually another scientist or student of  
science, and the texts refers to specific practices and methodological procedures.3 This is a 
crucial aspect of  scientific literature, as it must explicitly state the methodology used for 
obtaining data, so that such procedures could be replicated or altered by other scientists. In 
this way, scientific literature can generate more knowledge and guarantee its objectivity. 
Thirdly, from this perspective, objectivity depends on the circulation of  scientific knowledge 
and practices in different contexts, and this epistemic aspect is tied to the usual expectation 
that science should be an international enterprise. That conjunction between objectivity and 
internationalism imposes the homogenization of  practices and vocabularies for the 
communication of  results and replication of  procedures.4 In that way, as opposed to other 
kinds of  literature, scientific texts do not prioritize local specificities, but rather tend to 
diminish, if  not eliminate them. 
There is another aspect to consider. Scientific knowledge changes (grows, advances, 
develops) as new theories and evidence displace, refute or discredit previous ideas. In this 
sense, the recovery of  knowledge from the past by a current reader always implies some kind 
of  epistemological criteria with which to establish the pertinence, productivity, and relevance 
of  that “old” knowledge for the present state of  the art. Lucian of  Samosata might always 
be productive for fiction and poetry; Claudius Ptolemy, however, is not equally productive – 
 
3 In order to define a clear subject in this article, I will not consider “popular science” literature, directed toward 
lay people. On this topic, see Vincent (2003). 
4 In fact, this perspective is one of  the basis of  Vienna Circle program (cf. Hahn, Carnap, Neurath, 
1929/1996, p. 316). 




if  at all – for current astronomy and geometry. The circulation, reception and re-updating of  
scientific knowledge thus works in specific ways.  




Situatedness as agency: Some features of Standpoint Theory 
 
Proposed by Anglo-Saxon feminists in the late 1970s, ST draws on the thesis postulated by 
Marx and Engels in The German Ideology (1846/1998) and by György Lukács in his essay 
“Reification and the Consciousness of  the Proletariat” (1971). Stated briefly, ST claims that 
the gendered division of  labor and the specific conditions of  women’s socialization generate 
a material and structural position different from that of  men, from which the world can be 
known and experienced in a differentiated way. This would allow for the creation of  specific 
knowledge and practices critical of  the masculine ones that perpetuate gender inequality and 
oppressive practices towards women, which would lead to a challenge of  the status quo in the 
pursuit of  women’s emancipation (Hartsock, 1985). This proposal had a considerable impact 
on the constitution of  a new scientific epistemology in feminism, yet it also had its problems. 
The early version of  ST assumed the masculine/feminine opposition as central, and 
therefore considered women as a unified subject that experiences the same vital and 
economic conditions in every place, leaving out other dimensions as race, culture and 
sexuality that introduce many important differences in women’s experiences. When these 
dimensions were incorporated to the economic and relational facets of  the ST, they 
broadened its scope without losing its central tenet: the primacy of  situated experiences as 
knowledge is produced within material conditions and contingent relations. Such 
embeddedness allows for the consideration of  different perspectives about phenomena and 
enables the emergence of  new agents of  knowledge, which include, but are not limited to, 
women who are feminists (Hartsock, 1997). 
Mainstream philosophies of  science do not thematize the international division of  
scientific labor, and thus they do not consider the incidence of  race, gender, geographies, 
and class biases in the production of  knowledge (Harding, 1986, 2006). The economic 
dimension is particularly important not only in local conditions for knowledge production 
but also on its international dissemination. Past and current internationalism in science have 
worked as the imposition of  research agendas to the periphery by some centers – mainly the 
North-Atlantic ones – based on important economic, political and military differences 
between the two that define the international distribution of  labor (e.g. Kreimer, 2010; Raj, 




2013). ST enables the consideration of  the issues of  periphery, culture, gender, economy, 
and other historical and social aspects within the normative analysis of  science, and so it 
opposes the imposition of  an “abstract masculinity” as it considers crucial aspects of  reality 
not considered by such central, androcentric, Caucasian, bourgeois, and western rationality. 
Material conditions and systems of  relations affect the formation of  the scientist and 
define the research agenda. But this does not imply the acceptance of  a relativist stance 
without proper norms to decide which knowledge is better or worse; on the contrary, when 
knowledge is materialized in its specific conjunctures, it avoids assuming that it belongs to a 
universal, ahistorical realm that is valid per se for every place and time. ST as a philosophy of  
science seeks the procurement of  more objective knowledge because of  its reflection on the 
historical situations of  conception and development, and in doing so it provides sources for 
knowledge that may be disdained or inaccessible from other stances. ST looks for new 
grounds, such as marginalized agents, conceptions, problems and events, from which to 
establish a “strong objectivity” and “robust reflexivity” against philosophies of  science that 
do not consider the historical embeddedness of  scientific production, and thus only account 
for justification criteria that are offered as universal norms immediately applicable in any 
setting. For ST, such an approach is less objective, less productive and even ideological, 
because it offers restricted criteria and systematic biases without tools for reflexivity 
(Harding, 1996b). ST avers that “it is the perspectives of  economically, politically, and socially 
oppressed groups that can bring valuably novel insights to research projects” (Harding, 2015, 
p. 35). In this regard, the inclusion of  alternative or dismissed perspectives that may provide 
new hypothesis and evidence would allow for the revision of  the scope and biases of  current 
methods and theories.  
Accordingly, ST does not endorse any kind of  value neutrality. Knowledge provided 
by the new situated agents might introduce different realities that affect ethical and political 
values. The regular distinction in history of  science between epistemic and non-epistemic 
values cannot be defended if  that analytical distinction implies only the epistemic ones are 
relevant to scientists (e.g. Kuhn, 1983). The former cannot be understood without the latter, 
and that does not suppose that the rationality of  epistemic values necessarily have to be 
degraded. Epistemic values are more justifiable and productive insofar as they are considered 
along with non-epistemic values (Anderson, 2004; Kinkaid, Dupré &Wylie, 2007). This also 
contributes to a better historical understanding of  the ideas and choices scientists made in 











Distributed scientific thinking through embedded agents: Possible 
articulations between RA and ST 
 
What science considers well-established knowledge has changed historically, and it is clear 
that a given idea or theory would not have been considered scientific at a different historical 
moment. Even if  scientific limits are variable because they change with evidence and debates, 
several types of  demarcation criteria have been proposed to settle what kind of  knowledge 
is scientific and what kind is not. It is thus possible to give historical accounts of  how such 
criteria have been defined and disseminated in different scenarios. For RA, the re-
contextualization of  received knowledge does not imply that they are mere copies, even less 
distorted ones, but that their productivity is renewed in each crossing of  “horizons of  
expectation” which results in novel and specific “concretizations”. Furthermore, it allows for 
novel opportunities for contrast between theories, practices and evidence, as well as the 
examinations of  epistemic norms.5 
ST aims to examine which social formations enable or constitute theoretical 
questions and answers. Thus, its framework includes the historical conditions that fostered 
the emergence and reproduction of  epistemic and non-epistemic values in science, in 
particular those associated with “abstract masculinity”. Therefore, it is possible to reflect on 
how those values can be challenged, updated or changed. Also, this allows for the detection 
and rescuing of  “subjugated” knowledge with critical and normative perspectives, how it 
could be appropriated and modified, and its significance for the present. While ST keeps its 
focus in the present, RA can open the past in the search for neglected knowledge, as the 
problem of  the recovery of  the past in the present is a central part in hermeneutics, the 
tradition from which it has developed.6 This opens up the possibility for two operations; first, 
the extension of  loci, objects and agents for historical inquiry, which involves a critical 
 
5 It can be argued that knowledge does not travel alone, but with its criteria of  elaboration and justification. It 
should be noted, however, that knowledge is often appropriated with different criteria than those used in its 
initial production. Darwin’s and Lamarck’s evolutionary theories could be a case in point (Miranda y Vallejo, 
2005; Engels & Glick, 2008; Gissis & Jablonka, 2011). This implies that, although normative criteria are always 
present, the relevant epistemic norm has to be defined in each case. This also opens up the possibility of  
considering how the same evidence, methods and theories could be accepted by different, even opposing, 
epistemologies depending on their geographical and historical circulation. 
6 See Bernstein (2002, pp. 270-275) for a brief  exposition on this, following discussions of  “difference” by 
Gadamer and Habermas. For this topic, Marxist philosophy also serves as a connection between RA and ST; 
RA has roots and connections with Marx’s ideas on classic art (1857/1993), and the ideas on history of  Walter 
Benjamin (1969) and Karel Kosik (1963/1976). For the sake of  intellectual honesty, it must also be 
acknowledged that Jauss explicitly rejected literary theories based on the ideas of  Lukács (Jauss, 1975). This is 
worthy of  consideration for the debates between literary critics from Democratic and Federal Germany, but 
does not seem relevant for current philosophy of  sciences and its feminist approaches (cf. Jameson, 
1988/2004). 




decentering of  disciplinary canons – still the main references in history of  sciences, in any 
of  their approaches.  
It allows for a reconstruction of  how sciences are and were made “from below” by non-
canonical figures, such as middle range researchers and research teams, visiting researchers, 
scientists from peripheral contexts, immigrants, women, specific populations under study, 
and an array of  intermediaries, from journalistic outlets and publishing houses in different 
languages to managers of  international institutions. This centering of  groups and 
communities emphasizes how they interact and communicate through geographies and time, 
focusing particularly on who put specific scientific knowledges into circulation and in what 
way, as well as how the circuits and mediators have been historically defined. Second, it sets 
a limit to an overly intellectual approach to history, as it demands the examination of  social 
and material aspects that define how and by whom evidence is obtained and considered 
“objective”.7 This would avoid histories too centred in local controversies around the ideas 
of  canonical figures, from which conclusions are usually too swiftly extended to several 
locations at the same time, or they are used to represent the rationale of  dilated periods. As 
such, this articulation between RA and ST can be useful to both diachronic – the thorough 
reconstruction of  knowledge in a specific time in the past or in the present – and synchronic 
– the changes and itineraries through time of  theories, philosophical criteria, methodologies, 
agents and practices – approaches in studies of  science. In fact, such outlook would preclude 
a sole strategy in history of  science. It suggests that the aim is not a grand unified framework 
for history of  sciences, but rather the more achievable objective of  the necessity for a broad 
and reflexive approach to agents, problems and knowledges. 
As has already been mentioned, historical and geographical re-appropriation deserves 
a careful analysis with respect to science. It is possible to allege that authors are not 
completely subordinate to reading operations, and that texts are part of  their agency 
(Thompson, 1993). Scientific authors impose their ideas, authorship and authority in a 
different manner from literary authors; they have their own ways of  defining limits on how 
their work can be read or how their practices should be emulated based on their legitimacy 
for producing knowledge or the technical possibilities of  their context. This sets standards 
on truth claims derived from the results of  the research, and on the technological means 
 
7 About this specific issue, see Peter Dear’s and Matthew Jones’ objections to the mainly philosophical 
argumentation posed by Daston and Galison for a historical approach of  objectivity (Dear, Hacking, Jones, 
Daston & Galison, 2012, pp. 13-15, 28-29). Daston and Galison warned of  historical simplifications at the 
“macro” and “micro” level, where an overreaching context (e.g. capitalism, modernity, patriarchy) directly 
“explains” the specific ideas and practices of  scientists, or where the insistence on local specificities keeps the 
analysis blind to global patterns and structures (2007, pp. 197, 205; 47-48). But this warning, albeit reasonable, 
only calls for specific approaches able to track and assess the historical sources. The articulation has to be 
shown, not merely inferred; the approach presented here is useful for such reconstruction.  




required for their replication and confirmation. In a way, scientific texts are open to the extent 
that certain procedures and rules of  knowledge production are followed.  
Certainly, this does not mean that different readings cannot be carried out, but that they 
depend on the evaluation of  procedures that lead to relevant evidence. Considering this, it 
could be argued that one of  the limitations of  RA is that it is restricted to key readers, 
individuals or specific groups. This may not be a shortcoming in itself, but it may reveal that 
the analysis of  massive and/or non-differentiated audiences requires a specific approach with 
different methodological tools. On the other hand, Harding affirmed that standpoints “are 
not to be conceptualized only as perspectives. Everyone has perspectives on the world, but 
standpoints are intellectual and political achievements in that a group has to work together 
to figure out how to arrive at them” (2011, p. 19). Just as RA does not refer to massive 
audiences, ST is not meant to refer to solitary individuals or large undifferentiated groups. 
RA and ST are compatible in this respect, allowing for more historiographical precision in 
defining processes and actors. 
In that respect, ST, due to its emphasis on the contexts of  discovery and production, 
can resituate the problem of  epistemic norms within the conjuncture that produced them. 
The problem becomes one of  how and why the reader and the author have the same criteria 
for producing and evaluating knowledge (Ruetsche, 2004). That is to say, instead of  assuming 
the preexistence of  common norms beyond the circulation of  knowledge, the establishment 
of  shared norms in different conjunctures is what has to be historically examined. ST thus 
calls for research on the politics of  dissemination of  scientific knowledge, the 
internationalization of  its production conditions, and the distribution of  scientific work. 
Many lines of  inquiry could be opened up by such a perspective, such as how scientific 
knowledge is accepted where technical means, or even the object itself, are missing, but where 
there nevertheless exists a scientific community that is authorized by it.8 In addition, one 
could investigate how such a scientific community produces new knowledge from the 
knowledge it receives, without the possibility of  replicating this previous research. ST sheds 
light not only on the dissemination of  knowledge, but also on the implantation of  biases in 
science. The members of  a scientific community have multiple subjective positions that 
overdetermine – or multidetermine – their readings and appropriations, which results in 
different modalities of  reception. This implies that evaluation stances diverge, converge or 
contradict each other and cannot be limited to epistemic criteria, even when the latter is 
 
8 See, for example, the use of  Pavlov’s physiology in psychiatry outside U.S.S.R., in contexts where laboratories 
conditions and research were completely different – if  there were any –, and psychiatric practices were done 
with very different trainings and settings (Harris, 1995, Gao, 2015; García, 2015, Ruiz y Sánches, 2016; Lambe, 
2017). For detailed account on Pavlov’s laboratory and research, see Todes (2000, 2014). 




necessary. Appropriation and rejection of  knowledge in science is a process that potentially 
includes the whole range of  scientists’ experiences. 
 
A brief example: Pedagogy and communism in Latin America. 
 
Taken from my own research, the following is an example of  the kinds of  figures and 
processes for which this combined framework would be suitable. Berta Perelstein de 
Braslavsky (1913-2008) was born into a Jewish immigrant family. Her parents decided she 
would be a schoolteacher, a standard job for females and a feminized profession in the 1930s. 
Her studies were interrupted in 1936 when a ministerial decree expelled her from the 
Instituto del Profesorado Secundario [Secondary Professorate Institute] due to her 
involvement with the Communist Youth Federation, which gave rise to public scandal, both 
because of  the presence of  communism in public education and because she was a young 
“free” woman (Braslavsky, 1996, 2008). Braslavsky managed to continue her studies at the 
University of  Buenos Aires (UBA). Though she did not consider herself  a feminist, she 
nonetheless rejected religious and family values, choosing to live with her partner, himself  
from a traditional Jewish family, without immediately getting married. Once she graduated, 
unable to work in a public institution, she opened the Instituto de Argentino de Reeducación 
(IAR) [Argentinian Institute of  Reeducation] in 1944 with the psychiatrist and comrade Julio 
Peluffo, where she would study and give treatment to around 60 children with mild 
developmental and learning disorders. This specific demographic combined education, child 
rearing and health attention, all subjects strongly associated with female roles. She remained 
a full-time activist, and in 1948 she spoke in representation of  Argentina at the Second 
Women’s International Congress in Budapest on the imperialist economy, the inequality of  
wage for women, the poor working conditions of  female industrial workers and peasants, 
the excess of  work in the domestic sphere, and the lack of  proper laws for maternity 
(Women’s International Democratic Federation, 1949, pp. 333-338). Before returning to 
Argentina, she spent four months at the Laboratoire de psychobiologie de l'enfant in Paris 
[Laboratory of  child psychobiology], led by the communist psychologist and politician Henri 
Wallon. There she learned developmental theories and testing procedures that defined the 
work at the IAR. After her return, while still working at the IAR, she wrote a book in which 
she proposed dialectical and historical materialism as a philosophical surpassing of  
positivism and antipositivism and a basis for scientific thinking, in line with the communist 
stance at that time (Braslavsky, 1952).  
In her role of  communist intellectual and international activist, in 1954 she became 
the general secretary of  the Instituto de Relaciones Culturales Argentina-U.R.S.S. (IRCAU) 




[Soviet-Argentinian institute for cultural relationships], an institution officially recognized by 
the Argentinian government. In 1957 Braskavky was able to teach again and entered the 
UBA as professor. That same year, she got the support of  the Consejo Nacional de 
Educación [National Council of  Education] to conduct a series of  research projects on the 
methodology of  teaching, reading and writing in children with learning disadvantages, 
particularly dyslexia. The results of  those inquiries were synthesized in the book La querella 
de los métodos de enseñanza de la lectura [The Quarrel over Reading Teaching Methods] (1962/1992), a 
book that gave her recognition in Latin America and was republished many times. There she 
proposed a developmental psychology and neurophysiology that mixed the ideas of  Ivan Pavlov, 
Alexander Luria, Alexei Leontiev, Sergei Rubinstein, Wallon, René Zazzo and Jean Piaget – 
excluding the latter, all of  them were standard communist references for the psychological 
sciences. Braslavsky combined their ideas – something not done in Europe, where those 
authors tried to differentiate from each other – to support a holistic and environmental idea 
of  language functions as social products that preexist the child, who “internalizes” them 
though cultural transmission, and that determine the whole of  cognition, behavior, and 
personality by means of  functional modifications in the anatomy of  the nervous system. The 
school is one of  the most important spaces of  socialization, reading, and writing, and does 
not just endow children with cognitive abilities, but more importantly gives them the tools 
for a whole cultural and social existence. Braslavsky discussed the current approaches to 
reading and writing education, and dismissed them for not being founded in scientific 
psychologies. In her view, the problem with methods contributed to the indiscriminate 
diagnosis of  dyslexia, a disorder then blamed for failures by the educational institution.  
The specialists on the issue – mostly physicians, still by then a predominantly 
masculine profession – recommended special schooling, with different teachers, programs 
and buildings, and medical attention for children with this pathology. Braslavsky rejected all 
teaching and diagnostic methods that reduced child psychology to internal factors, and 
criticized special schooling as “the dyslexic disorder is manifested, if  not produced, in an 
essentially pedagogical situation such as the school environment” (p. 156). The pathology 
was therefore not independent from teaching methods, so special education and medical 
treatments were not the solution; even worse, they hampered the socialization of  the child. 
Her positions led to an open polemic in 1963 with Julio Bernaldo de Quirós, by then 
president of  Argentine Speech-Language and Hearing Therapy Association and director of  
its specialist journal Fonoaudiológica, during the in the First Seminar on Dyslexia in 
Montevideo, Uruguay. There Quirós stated that statistics proved that “heredity seems to be 
an important factor, much more important than environment”; Braslavky, replied that 




“reading is an acquisition, not an innate possibility” (Grompone, et al., 1965, pp. 28, 140). In 
that dispute she represented the stance of  teachers, still a feminized profession linked to the 
humanities, against that of  physicians, a mainly masculine profession that was considered 
fully scientific (Barrancos, 2010, 220-224). Braslavsky’s communist ideals of  social justice 
and readings of  leftist psychology and physiology were the basis of  her stance. Her 
researched intertwined her political commitment with applied research, taking into account 
the work of  Soviet and French Communist scholars without assuming their thesis a priori, as 
she employed her own methods and ideas, and searched for intellectual tools and data from 
non-communist authors. Her ideology set out problems, references, and certain hypothesis, 
but that did not imply an orthodox or partisan closure in her actual research, as is usually 
attributed to communist scientists. Political values lead her ideas on psychology and 
pedagogy, but evidence and problems were not collapsed into ideological limits. 
After some years of  full time teaching at the UBA and the Universidad Nacional de 
La Plata, the 1976 coup d’état drove her to exile in Venezuela, where she became a consultant 
for the local ministry of  education, for Mexican and Cuban programs and for UNESCO. 
When the military dictatorship ended, she went back to Argentina and in 1986 was appointed 
as the director of  the new department of  Education Sciences of  the UBA. In this position 
she promoted the pedagogical ideas of  Vygotsky with specific graduate and postgraduate 
courses, and organized a four-year research program on methods of  reading and writing for 
the Buenos Aires city council to design the first-grade curriculum in public schools. The 
results of  this research were implemented in the schools and published in the book La escuela 
puede [The school is able] (1991). Although Braslavsky had left the Communist Party by then 
because of  its conciliatory position toward the dictatorship, she still drew on Vygotsky’s ideas 
on cognition and development; in fact, this research was the first in the country to apply the 
Soviet psychologist’s theories on concrete public school practices.  
This overview of  Braslavsky’s ideas, work, and life shows that a history of  her 
knowledge and practices cannot be understood without at the same time taking into account 
that she was Argentine, communist, and a woman. As such, she occupied a triply peripheral 
position: from the Western academic centers, from the political liberalism and conservatism 
of  South America, and from a feminized profession not considered a “hard” science. In this 
example, RA would explore how political, psychological, pedagogical, and physiological ideas 
arrived from Western and Eastern Europe, while ST would account for how Braslavsky’s 
own position in the social field and stance toward leftist values and ideologies provided a 
specific position from which to conduct research with a defined population and condition, 
and produce a scientific interpretation of  data to discuss with local and international authors. 




From that characterization, her figure leads to the history of  pedagogy in Latin America, the 
communist dissemination of  scientific ideas, the roles assigned to women in society, and the 
capabilities and problems of  an individual to produce knowledge from that setting. The 
combined approach of  RA and ST allows for this kind of  systematic and intertwined 
examination of  the agent, the knowledges involved and means of  circulation, and the specific 
political and social conditions of  different contexts. Though she was not a figure of  the 
disciplinary canon, Braslavsky’s position as a peripheral middle range researcher who was 
nonetheless influential in Latin America provides an example in which the combined 
framework of  RA and ST would give a thorough description of  her conditions and activities 
for producing knowledge, as well as a novel starting point for histories of  science, based on 
the circulation of  knowledge, the disputes for legitimation of  knowledge, and the possibilities 





This short essay tried to show some articulation between two different frameworks to 
propose a historiographical outlook that is sensitive to the circulation and embeddedness of  
scientific knowledge, and the changes that this process implies. RA can offer a solid historical 
approach to ST, and the latter can in turn introduce epistemological issues into the reception 
process of  scientific production. The historization of  scientific knowledge and their 
epistemic norms can offer new insights into how current knowledge is generated and 
justified. The combined framework proposed here is suitable for the inquiry and assessment 
of  knowledge production, both for the history and philosophy of  science, and for science in 
general: it permits an informed recuperation of  past knowledges, problems and failures; it 
provides criteria with which to advance historical studies and obtain evidence for a critical 
examination of  the means for production and dissemination of  science; and it opposes 
ahistorical epistemologies that attempt to exert normative dominance based in an explicit or 
tacit universal rationality. All of  this adds epistemic and philosophical value to the history of  
science. 
Knowledge agents are active constructors in the process of  reception, and so there 
is always some form of  normativity with which they can read, evaluate and make received 
knowledge productive. Reception Aesthetics enables this level of  analysis and provides the 
specific means by which to carry it out, introducing a historicity that is impeded by the usual 
overgeneralizations of  mainstream philosophical approaches. Correspondingly, Standpoint 
Theory is open to such historicization and provides intellectual tools and approaches to 
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